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 II.-366 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VISA PETITION 
REVOCATIONS: A “PRECEDENTIAL 
CASCADE” 
Abstract: The Secretary of Homeland Security has the power to revoke ap-
proved visa petitions pursuant to the grant of authority in 8 U.S.C. § 1155, part of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The circuit courts disagree over 
whether the Secretary’s decisions under this provision are subject to judicial re-
view. On April 7, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
in Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, held that the Secretary’s authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 
is discretionary. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit joined nine other circuit courts to 
find that visa petition revocation decisions are discretionary and, as such, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of the decisions. This Com-
ment considers the impact of the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Kucana v. Holder, 
on the analysis of jurisdictional bars in cases like Polfliet. This Comment argues 
that the Fourth Circuit, in Polfliet, should have adopted the interpretive principles 
that the Supreme Court used in Kucana and resisted the precedential cascade. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), United States citizens 
and lawful permanent residents may submit visa petitions to the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on behalf of certain family 
members, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1154.1 After receiving an approved visa peti-
                                                                                                                           
 1 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iv) (authorizing visa petitions based on family relationships 
including for spouses and children). Lawful permanent residents are noncitizens with authorization to 
reside permanently in the United States. See id. § 1101(a)(20) (defining “lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence”). United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is a division of the De-
partment of Homeland Security that oversees the processing of immigration applications including 
visa petitions and citizenship. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1) (authorizing the assignment of the adjudica-
tion of visa petitions to USCIS). The “petitioner” is the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident sub-
mitting the application, and the “beneficiary” is the alien family member seeking to immigrate. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1154; IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 1442 (17th ed. 2020) 
(describing the relationship between petitioner and beneficiary for family-based visa petitions). USCIS 
reviews the nature of the family relationship and the petitioner’s immigration status to determine eligibil-
ity for a visa petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2) (2020) (describing the required evidence for visa peti-
tion applications for a child). Family visa petitions are not available to U.S. citizens with certain convic-
tions for offenses related to minors, absent a discretionary determination that the petitioner poses no risk 
to the beneficiary, pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act (AWA). See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii) (promul-
gating the AWA’s visa petition eligibility bar that was intended to protect noncitizens from any risks asso-
ciated with obtaining visa petitions based on relationships with citizens that have certain criminal histo-
ries).  
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tion, the beneficiary may apply for legal permanent residence.2 An approved 
visa petition does not guarantee a subsequent grant of permanent residency.3 
USCIS considers additional admissibility grounds and retains the discretionary 
authority to deny admission.4 Additionally, USCIS may revoke an approved 
visa petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155.5 Revocation of a visa petition elimi-
nates the beneficiary’s eligibility for a visa but does not automatically result in 
removal from the United States.6 Petitioners may appeal revocation decisions 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).7 After exhausting administrative 
remedies, petitioners sometimes seek judicial review of the revocation decision 
in federal court, but they often encounter a jurisdictional bar.8 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1202 (providing the requirements to apply for an immigrant visa); id. § 1255 
(describing the requirements for another mechanism for obtaining permanent residence once a person 
has a valid immigrant visa); Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 582, 582 (B.I.A. 1988) (describing an ap-
proved visa petition as a preliminary step to acquiring an actual visa). 
 3 Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 582 (holding that an approved visa petition does not bestow rights nor 
entitle the beneficiary to an immigrant visa). 
 4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (outlining the eligibility criteria for obtaining permanent residence status such as 
having a valid visa petition or prolonged physical presence in the United States); id. § 1182 (enumerating 
grounds for denying admission, including health, criminal history, threats to national security, and likelihood 
of being a public charge); see also Rebecca Hayes, Comment, Lawful Permanent Residency: What the 
United States Citizenship & Immigration Services Giveth, It Can Also Take Away, 59 B.C. L. REV. ELEC. 
SUPP. 329, 332–36 (2018), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss9/19 [https://perma.cc/
V6YG-4WQC] (discussing the history and evolution of eligibility requirements for obtaining lawful 
admission for permanent residence).  
 5 8 U.S.C. § 1155. To revoke a visa petition, USCIS must issue a notice of intent to revoke the peti-
tion and allow the petitioner the opportunity to respond with evidence to refute the revocation. See 8 
C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (2020) (governing the process of visa petition revocation). Then, USCIS must issue 
a written explanation of its decision. Id. A previous version of § 1155 required the issuance of notice 
before the petitioner travelled to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1996) (authorizing the revoca-
tion of visa petitions so long as the petitioner received notice prior to entering the United States). Con-
gress removed that requirement in 2004. See id. § 1155 (2004) (authorizing the revocation of visa peti-
tions regardless of the location of the beneficiary). 
 6 See, e.g., Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that the individual was 
not in removal proceedings despite the revocation of his visa petition years earlier). The government 
must separately initiate removal proceedingsadjudications in which noncitizens have an opportunity to 
present evidence, and an immigration judge determines the noncitizen’s eligibility to remain in the Unit-
ed States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2020). The Government initiates removal proceedings by issuing a notice to 
appear. Id. § 1229(a). A notice to appear is a legal document that states the immigration charges brought 
against a noncitizen. Id. § 1229(a)(1). 
 7 See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(d) (2020) (enumerating petitioners’ procedural rights once USCIS has 
revoked their visa). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the administrative body within the 
Department of Justice that reviews immigration decisions. See id. § 1003.1(d) (describing the powers 
and jurisdiction of the BIA as an appellate forum for immigration decisions). 
 8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (proscribing limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts to review 
immigration decisions); see also Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
review the visa petition revocation decision). Judicial review refers to courts’ ability to examine and 
overturn the decisions of the other branches of government. Judicial Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (11th ed. 2019). This Comment refers to statutes that prohibit federal courts from reviewing im-
migration decisions as jurisdictional bars. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (barring judicial review of certain im-
migration decisions). 
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Congress drastically restricted judicial review of certain immigration deci-
sions further in 1996 when it enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).9 Congress enacted IIRIRA’s jurisdictional 
bar to expedite the removal process by precluding certain immigration decisions 
from judicial review in federal court.10 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars specific 
immigration decisions from judicial review.11 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is the 
catchall provision of the jurisdictional bar, and it precludes judicial review of 
discretionary decisions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).12 
The § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) jurisdictional bar does not specify which immigration 
decisions are discretionary, but rather leaves courts do decide if the underlying 
immigration statute specifically grants discretionary authority such that the 
jurisdictional bar applies.13 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (expanding the type of immigration decisions barred from judicial re-
view to include a broad category of discretionary decisions). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act’s (IIRIRA) jurisdictional bar precludes judicial review of decisions regarding 
admissibility, denials of discretionary relief, removal orders for those with criminal convictions, as well 
as any other discretionary decisions. Id.; see Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 245–46 (2010) (discuss-
ing the scope of the § 1252(a)(2) jurisdictional bars). In 2004, Congress added an exception from the 
jurisdictional bar for constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Some courts 
narrowly interpret this preservation of judicial review to apply only to claims arising during removal 
proceedings. See, e.g., Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384 (declining to review constitutional claims made out-
side of removal proceedings); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1346–47 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that § 1252(a)(2)(D) applies only to petitions for review of removal decisions). 
 10 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 142 (1996) (describing the need for jurisdic-
tional bars to streamline immigration cases by avoiding the added delay of federal court review); see 
Michael A. Keough, Kucana v. Holder and Judicial Review of the Decision Not to Reopen Sua Sponte 
in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2088–90 (2012) (describing the 
purpose of IIRIRA to expedite immigration processes by restricting judicial review and the resulting 
consolidation of power within the executive branch). 
 11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (listing barred decisions, including those regarding certain 
waivers of inadmissibility, cancellation of removal, permission for voluntary departure and adjustment 
of status); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 247 (noting that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) listed substantive decisions related 
to the ability to remain in the United States that are not subject to judicial review). 
 12 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Sands v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 308 F. App’x 418, 419 
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding the jurisdictional bar applies to § 1155 because it is an applica-
ble discretionary decision under the INA). Precisely which immigration decisions are discretionary is 
still subject to discussion more than twenty years after the enactment of IIRIRA. See Daniel Kan-
stroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion and the “Rule” of Immigration Law, 
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 163 (2007) (noting that distinguishing law from discretion is challenging 
because discretion is difficult to define). 
 13 See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 246–47 (holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to specified statutory 
grants of discretionary authority). The INA does not define discretion but leaves courts to determine 
whether immigration statutes convey discretionary authority. See generally, Kanstroom, supra note 
12, at 180–89 (discussing the difficulty courts face in distinguishing law from discretion and the in-
consistency that results). Discretion is generally the ability to freely exercise judgement. Discretion, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8. Congress usually delegates authority to the Attorney General 
or the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary may then delegate its discretionary authority 
to the USCIS, which is located within the Department of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b) 
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Circuit courts disagree on whether § 1155 contains an objective legal 
standard that constrains the discretionary authority to revoke visa petitions.14 
The majority of circuit courts concluded that the jurisdictional bar applies be-
cause the language of § 1155 clearly vests unambiguous discretionary authori-
ty to USCIS to revoke visa petitions.15 In April 2020, the Fourth Circuit, in 
Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, became the tenth circuit court to reach this conclusion.16 
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit should have retained juris-
diction to review visa petition revocation decisions.17 Part I of this Comment 
provides an overview of the application of jurisdictional bars to preclude re-
view of visa petition revocation decisions.18 Part II discusses the divergent 
statutory interpretations of § 1155 after the Supreme Court decision in 2010, 
Kucana v. Holder.19 Finally, Part III argues that the approach of the majority of 
circuits requires reconsideration in light of the Court’s narrow construction of 
jurisdictional bars in Kucana.20 
                                                                                                                           
(listing the functions that the Secretary transferred to USCIS such as adjudicating visa petitions, refu-
gee applications, and citizenship petitions). 
 14 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (permitting the Secretary to revoke a previously approved visa petition “at any 
time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause”); see ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893 
(9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “good and sufficient cause” is a legal standard). But see Jilin Pharm. USA, 
Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that § 1155 lacks a legal standard). If the 
phrase “good and sufficient cause” is a legal standard, then the court retains jurisdiction to review the 
revocation decision. See ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893 (interpreting § 1155 to contain a legal standard that 
constrains the Secretary’s discretion, therefore retaining jurisdiction). If the court finds that § 1155 grants 
unconstrained discretionary authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security, then § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
precludes judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (barring discretionary decisions from judi-
cial review); see, e.g., Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 377, 383 (holding that § 1155 clearly conveys discretionary 
authority); Bernardo ex rel. M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 482 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding 
that the jurisdictional bar precluded review of discretionary § 1155 decisions); El-Khader v. Monica, 
366 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the text of the statute clearly conveys discretion). 
 15 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 (finding that § 1155’s terms unambiguously convey discretion to 
USCIS to retract visa petitions); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 485–86 (same); Mehanna v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigr. Serv., 677 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1345 
(10th Cir. 2010) (same); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Ghanem v. 
Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); Jilin Pharm., 447 F.3d at 202 (same); El-
Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (same). 
 16 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384 (joining the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits to hold that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of visa petition revocation 
decisions). 
 17 See infra notes 88–103 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 21–61 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 88–103 and accompanying text. 
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I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS TO REVOKE VISA PETITIONS 
Visa petitions are a preliminary step for recipients to obtain legal admis-
sion to the United States.21 When the Attorney General revokes a visa petition, 
the recipient often seeks reversal of that decision which may lead them to pur-
sue judicial review of the revocation decision in federal court.22 In 2004, the 
Ninth Circuit, in ANA International, Inc. v. Way, retained jurisdiction to review 
visa petition revocations.23 Nine other circuit courts, however, have held that 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of the revocations.24 Section A of 
this Part provides an overview of the early circuit split.25 Section B discusses the 
2010 Supreme Court ruling in Kucana v. Holder and its impact on the 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) analysis.26 Section C discusses the contributions of the recent 
Fourth Circuit decision in Polfliet v. Cuccinelli to the dialogue surrounding the 
discretionary nature of visa revocation decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1155.27 
A. Interpreting § 1155: The Initial Circuit Split 
The first two circuit courts to decide whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applied 
to visa petition revocation decisions reached opposite results.28 In 2004, the 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1202 (enumerating the application requirements for an immigrant visa including 
a valid travel document, documentation of identity, and a consular interview); id. § 1255 (providing 
the process for obtaining legal permanent residency status); Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 582, 582 
(B.I.A. 1988) (stating that an approved visa petition is an initial step in the visa process). 
 22 See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(d) (2020) (describing petitioners’ procedural rights to appeal revocation 
decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)); Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 
2020) (discussing whether the court has jurisdiction to review the visa petition revocation decision 
after the petitioner and recipient have exhausted administrative remedies); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 
F.3d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 2007) (considering judicial review of a visa petition revocation decision after 
the BIA affirmed the revocation decision). 
 23 See ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the court retained 
jurisdiction to review the decisions because the statute authorizing revocation, 8 U.S.C. § 1155, con-
tained a legal standard). 
 24 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d 377 (holding that the text of § 1155 specifies discretionary authority and 
therefore the jurisdictional bar precludes review); Bernardo ex rel. M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 
F.3d 481, 485–86 (1st Cir. 2016) (same); Mehanna v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., 677 F.3d 312, 
315 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); Ab-
delwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Sands v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
308 F. App’x 418 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (same); Ghanem, 481 F.3d at 225 (same); Jilin Pharm. 
USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 
567 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); Firstland Int’l, Inc. v. I.N.S., 377 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); see 
also iTech U.S., Inc. v. Cuccinelli, 474 F. Supp. 3d 291, 295 (D.D.C. 2020) (rejecting the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s approach in ANA Int’l to find that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of a visa 
petition revocation decision), appeal docketed, No. 20-5235 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 2020). 
 25 See infra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 44–61 and accompanying text. 
 28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (barring judicial review of certain discretionary immigration 
decisions); id. § 1155 (governing visa petition revocations); El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (holding that 
the jurisdictional bar applied to visa petition revocation decisions); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (finding 
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Seventh Circuit, in El-Khader v. Monica, held that the plain language of 
§ 1155 granted discretionary authority to revoke visa petitions.29 The court 
found that determining “good and sufficient cause” was a subjective, discre-
tionary judgement.30 Therefore, the court held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars 
judicial review of § 1155 decisions.31 
Also in 2004, the Ninth Circuit in ANA International, Inc. v. Way split 
from the Seventh Circuit.32 In a split panel decision, the Ninth Circuit retained 
jurisdiction to review visa petition revocations by finding that the language of 
§ 1155 included an objective legal standard.33 The Ninth Circuit narrowly in-
                                                                                                                           
that 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not preclude judicial review of a visa petition revocation decision). In both 
El-Khader and ANA Int’l, the government revoked the noncitizens’ visa petitions after investigating 
their applications for lawful permanent residence. El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 564; ANA Int’l , 393 F.3d at 
889. 
 29 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (finding that Congress’ use of the term “may” 
and the phrase “at any time” indicated discretion). USCIS revoked El-Khader’s visa petition after 
determining that his former marriage was fraudulent. El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 564–65. 
 30 8 U.S.C. § 1155; El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 568. Later in 2004, the Second Circuit, in Firstland 
International, Inc. v. I.N.S., agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in dicta. See 377 F.3d 127, 
131 (2d Cir. 2004) (retaining jurisdiction to review the visa revocation decision in this instance but 
signaling agreement with El-Khader’s interpretation of § 1155 as discretionary). The Firstland deci-
sion concerned the interpretation of the final two sentences of an earlier version of § 1155, that mandated 
that petitioners receive notice of a revocation before travelling to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 
(1996) (requiring petitioner’s receipt of a revocation notice while still abroad); Firstland Int’l, 377 
F.3d at 131–32 (holding that the notice requirement was a legal standard that was subject to judicial 
review). Although the court retained jurisdiction to review the procedural challenge, it noted that the 
decision to revoke a visa petition was likely discretionary. See Firstland Int’l, 377 F.3d at 132 (finding 
that the notice requirement constrained § 1155’s otherwise discretionary authority). Shortly after the 
Firstland decision, Congress removed the statutory notice requirement. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2004) 
(amending the statute to eliminate any procedural provisions). See generally Firstland Int’l, 377 F.3d at 
127 (reviewing the application of the objective notice requirement in § 1155 in August 2004).  
 31 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (finding that the jurisdictional bar applied be-
cause the statute was discretionary). To reach this holding, the court also decided that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
applied outside of removal proceedings. See El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (finding that the jurisdictional 
bar applied to visa petition revocation decisions). In the 2005 amendments to § 1252(a)(2)(B), Congress 
codified that the jurisdictional bar applied beyond the removal context. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) 
(2005) (adding language to specify the broad scope of the jurisdictional bar). 
 32 See ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (retaining jurisdiction to review § 1155 decisions). But see El-
Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (holding that the jurisdictional bar precludes review of § 1155 decisions). In 
ANA Int’l, USCIS revoked an I-140 employment visa petition by asserting that the beneficiary failed 
to meet a requirement of his visa petition by not demonstrating that he served a managerial role. 393 
F.3d at 889–90. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the words “may” and “at any 
time” convey some level of discretion, yet unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis did 
not end there. See ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (finding that the presence of a legal standard constrained 
the statute’s discretionary terms); El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (emphasizing the plain language); see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2020) (authorizing the revocation of visa petitions “at any time”). 
 33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (granting authority to revoke visa petitions for “good and sufficient 
cause”); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893–94 (finding that BIA and Ninth Circuit precedent treated “good 
and sufficient cause” as a legal standard); see also Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw., Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 
F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that § 1155 contains a legal standard); Matter of Tawfik, 20 
II.-372 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
terpreted the jurisdictional bar to apply only to grants of pure discretion.34 
Therefore, because the decision to revoke a visa petition depended, in part, on 
satisfying an objective legal standard, the jurisdictional bar did not apply.35 
B. Kucana v. Holder and the § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) Analysis 
In 2010, in Kucana, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) jurisdictional bar precludes judicial review of administra-
tive denials of motions to reopen removal proceedings.36 The Court held that 
the jurisdictional bar applies only to statutes that explicitly grant discretionary 
authority.37 Therefore, because regulations, rather than statutes, govern mo-
tions to reopen, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar review of motions to reopen.38 
                                                                                                                           
I. & N. Dec. 166, 168–69 (B.I.A. 1990) (finding that “good and sufficient cause” requires a meaning-
ful evidentiary showing). 
 34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (prohibiting judicial review of immigration decisions that are 
discretionary); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (finding that jurisdictional bars apply only when decisions 
are entirely discretionary). The court grounded its analysis in a strong presumption of jurisdiction over 
administrative decisions. See ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (finding that the presumption of jurisdiction 
was well established in the immigration context). 
 35 See ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893 (retaining jurisdiction to review the application of the good and 
sufficient cause standard). Subsequently, the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have joined the 
Seventh Circuit in holding that § 1155 conveys discretionary authority, and, therefore, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
bars judicial review of visa petition revocation decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (authorizing the revocation 
of visa petitions); id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (barring judicial review of discretionary agency decisions); Jilin 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that no legal standard curtailed 
§ 1155’s discretionary language); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the statutory language conveys discretionary authority); Sands v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 308 
F. App’x 418 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to § 1155); Ghanem v. Up-
church, 481 F.3d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that the language clearly grants discretionary authori-
ty); El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 567 (holding that the language of § 1155 is plainly discretionary). 
 36 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010). Motions to reo-
pen allow noncitizens to request re-examination of a removal decision based on new information. See 
Kucana, 558 U.S. at 238, 242 (describing the purpose of motions to reopen). New evidence of wors-
ening conditions in Albania justified Kucana’s motion to reopen. See id. at 240 (describing that the 
change in political conditions in Albania warranted reopening Kucana’s asylum claim). Kucana did 
not directly involve the interpretation of § 1155. See generally id. at 243–52 (lacking specific discus-
sion of § 1155); Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377, 382 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding that Kucana was not 
relevant to interpreting § 1155). Judge Kermit Lipez of the First Circuit, however, has noted that alt-
hough Kucana is not directly on point, it can aid a court’s interpretation of jurisdictional bars. See Ber-
nardo ex rel. M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 508 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lipez, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that interpretive methods from Kucana inform the analysis of jurisdictional bars). 
 37 See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 246–47 (finding that the statutory construction of § 1252(a)(2) sug-
gests that the jurisdictional bar applies only to congressional grants of discretionary authority). 
 38 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 246–47 (holding that the regulation did 
not preclude judicial review under a narrow reading of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) because Congress intended 
the jurisdictional bar to apply only to statutes). This decision also avoided the situation in which the 
Attorney General could craft a regulation granting himself discretionary authority, thereby insulating any 
administrative decisions from judicial review, which the Court held was not consistent with congressional 
intent. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 252 (noting that barring judicial review of regulatory grants of discre-
tion would exceed congressional intent). 
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The Court emphasized that statutes must explicitly specify discretionary 
authority for the jurisdictional bar to apply.39 Additionally, the Court examined 
the structure of the jurisdictional bar to interpret its scope.40 The Court charac-
terized the enumerated decisions that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) barred as substantive 
because they concerned the ability to remain in the United States.41 In contrast, 
the Court designated motions to reopen as adjunct, procedural decisions.42 
Moreover, the Court reasserted that a presumption of jurisdiction to review 
administrative decisions guides the interpretation of jurisdictional bars.43 
C. The Factual Background of Polfliet v. Cuccinelli 
In April 2020, in Polfliet, the Fourth Circuit joined the majority of circuit 
courts in interpreting § 1155 as a grant of discretionary power.44 The appellants 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243 n.10 (emphasizing that the definition of “specify” is more precise 
than implied or anticipated). Since Kucana, those seeking judicial review of visa petition revocations 
have pointed to the Court’s discussion of the definition of “specify” and argued that § 1155 lacks the 
requisite explicit indication of discretionary authority. Id.; see, e.g., Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381–82 (reject-
ing the appellant’s contention that clearly specifying discretion requires the word “discretion”). 
 40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (barring judicial review of both specific and broad categories of 
decisions); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 246–48 (analyzing § 1252(a)(2)’s construction to deduce the scope of 
the statute’s catchall provision). First, the Court compared § 1252(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) to conclude 
that the jurisdictional bar applies to statutory, and not regulatory, grants of discretionary authority. 
Kucana, 558 U.S. at 246; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (barring judicial review of final removal orders, 
decisions related to discretionary relief, and decisions concerning noncitizens with certain criminal 
records). 
 41 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (barring review of specific discretionary relief decisions including 
inadmissibility waivers, cancellation of removal, permission for voluntary departure and adjustment of 
status); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 247 (categorizing the nature of the provisions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
 42 Kucana, 558 U.S. at 248. The Court explained that motions to reopen are a mechanism for 
ensuring procedural fairness and are not explicitly tied to ability to stay in the United States. Id. 
 43 See id. at 251–52 (asserting that the longstanding presumption of judicial review applies to 
immigration decisions). The Court articulated that the interpretive principle requires clear and con-
vincing evidence to overcome the presumption of judicial review. Id. at 252. Since Kucana, the First, 
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have found that § 1155 overcomes the presumption of jurisdiction. See Bernar-
do ex rel. M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 485 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that § 1155 is 
explicitly discretionary and overcomes the presumption of jurisdiction); Mehanna v. U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigr. Serv., 677 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the language of § 1155 unambigu-
ously conveys discretion and overcomes the presumption of judicial review); Green v. Napolitano, 
627 F.3d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that § 1155 unambiguously specifies discretion). Nota-
bly, the First Circuit issued a split panel decision, in which the dissenting judge argued that the statutory 
construction analysis, the emphasis on the definition of “specified,” and the presumption of judicial re-
view in Kucana compel a different result. Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 496 (Lipez, J., dissenting); see 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (barring judicial review of decisions made pursuant to statutes that specify 
discretionary authority); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243 n.10, 245–50 (elaborating on the meaning of “speci-
fy” as providing explicit detail). 
 44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (authorizing the revocation of visa petitions); Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 
(joining the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). Prior to 2020, 
nine circuit courts had decided that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applied to visa petition revocation decisions. See 
Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 485–86 (barring judicial review of petition revocation decisions); Mehanna, 
677 F.3d at 315 (same); Green, 627 F.3d at 1346 (same); Sands v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 308 
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were Polfliet, a United States citizen, and Kimiki, a Japanese national and the 
stepson of Polfliet.45 Kimiki lived with his mother and Polfliet in the United 
States.46 USCIS granted Polfliet a I-130 family visa petition for Kimiki in June 
2012.47 In November 2013, USCIS revoked the I-130 visa petition after dis-
covering that Polfliet had a conviction for possession of child pornography 
from 2000.48 Polfliet’s conviction rendered him ineligible to file family visa 
petitions absent a determination that he posed no risk to Kimiki, pursuant to 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (AWA).49 Polfliet and Kimiki 
appealed this decision to the BIA, but the BIA dismissed it for lack of jurisdic-
tion.50 The appellants then sought judicial review of the revocation decision in 
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Orangeburg 
                                                                                                                           
F. App’x 418 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (same); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (same); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); Jilin Pharm. USA, 
Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 567 
(7th Cir. 2004) (same); Firstland Int’l, Inc. v. I.N.S., 377 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) (retaining juris-
diction to review a procedural issue but noting that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) otherwise prevented review). 
Following the Fourth Circuit decision in Polfliet, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dock-
eted a case presenting the same question. See iTech U.S., Inc. v. Cuccinelli, 474 F. Supp. 3d 291, 295 
(D.D.C. 2020) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of a visa petition revoca-
tion decision), appeal docketed, No. 20-5235 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 2020). 
 45 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 379. Polfliet served in the United States Air Force in Japan, where he met 
Kimiki’s mother. Id. 
 46 Id. Polfliet had previously successfully petitioned for an I-130 visa for his wife, Kimiki’s mother, 
who later obtained U.S. citizenship without issue. Id. 
 47 Id. I-130 visa petitions provide a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship for alien 
family members of U.S. citizens who live together. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (describing the process 
for adjustment of status to obtain permanent residency). 
 48 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 379–80. A military tribunal convicted Polfliet of violating Uniform Code 
of Military Justice 18 U.S.C. § 2252A in 2000. Id. at 379; see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (prohibiting activi-
ties related to child pornography). This conviction preceded Polfliet’s marriage to Kimiki’s mother. 
Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 379. USCIS asserted that they only discovered the conviction upon reviewing 
Kimiki’s eligibility for lawful permanent residence. Id. at 380. 
 49 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 380; see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii) (2006) (granting the Secretary sole 
discretion to make an exemption). The AWA bars U.S. citizens with convictions for offenses against 
minors from applying for family visa petitions. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii). Congress enacted the 
AWA in 2006 and it was in effect at the time Polfliet filed an I-130 visa petition for his wife and his 
stepson. Id.; Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 379. USCIS did not raise Polfliet’s conviction until November 2013. 
Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 379. 
 50 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 380. The Fourth Circuit opinion conflicted with the District Court opinion, 
which stated that the BIA affirmed USCIS’s revocation decision. Compare id. (asserting that the BIA 
dismissed the appeal), with Polfliet v. Rodriguez, No. 16-cv-03358, 2017 WL 4348521, at *2 (D.S.C. 
Sept. 28, 2017) (noting that the BIA reviewed and affirmed the decision). This distinction is relevant 
because petitioner’s right to appeal a visa petition revocation is an enumerated procedural protection. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2020) (requiring notice of intent to revoke; notice of the revocation decision; 
and a right to an administrative appeal). Courts have held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar judicial 
review of procedural errors in visa petition revocations. See Musunuru v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 880, 888 
(7th Cir. 2016) (retaining jurisdiction to review application of regulatory procedures, not discretionary 
factors); Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 728 (2d Cir. 2015) (retaining jurisdiction to review 
USCIS’s procedural compliance); Kurapati v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., 775 F.3d 1255, 1262 
(11th Cir. 2014) (finding that USCIS’s procedural errors were not discretionary). 
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Division.51 The district court granted USCIS’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.52 The court found that the jurisdictional bar pre-
cluded review because § 1155 conveyed discretionary authority.53 Polfliet and 
Kimiki appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit.54 
The Fourth Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes visa petition rev-
ocation decisions from judicial review.55 The court rejected the appellants’ ar-
gument that the absence of the word “discretion” in § 1155 rendered the statute 
ambiguous.56 The court distinguished this case from Kucana by limiting Kuca-
na’s holding to its assertion that the jurisdictional bar does not apply to regulato-
ry grants of discretionary authority.57 Pointing to the plain language of § 1155, 
the court held that the statute was unambiguous.58 Additionally, the court reject-
ed the Ninth Circuit’s reading of “good and sufficient cause” as an objective le-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Polfliet, 2017 WL 4348521, at *2 (dismissing all statutory and constitutional counts that 
Polfliet and Kimiki alleged because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Polfliet, 955 F.3d 
at 380 (discussing the district court’s decision). 
 52 Polfliet, 2017 WL 4348521, at *6; Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 8 (defining the authority to hear matters of a specific nature). The petitioners alleged that 
the revocation decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act, due process, and improperly applied 
the AWA retroactively. Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 380. Polfliet and Kimiki argued that the visa petition revo-
cation constituted a deprivation of their constitutional property interest. Id. The court rejected this 
notion, however, reasoning that if USCIS has the ability to revoke visa petitions, then approved visa 
petitions do not constitute legitimate property interests. See Polfliet, 2017 WL 4348521, at *4 (finding 
that the petitioners had no constitutional property interest (citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 
545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005))). 
 53 8 U.S.C. § 1155; Polfliet, 2017 WL 4348521, at *5. 
 54 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 377. 
 55 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (barring judicial review of a broad category of discretionary 
decisions); id. § 1155 (authorizing the revocation of visa petitions); Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384 (joining 
nine circuit courts in splitting from the Ninth Circuit to reach this holding). 
 56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (providing the authority to revoke visa petitions at any time); Polfliet, 955 
F.3d at 381–82 (holding that the language was unambiguous without the word discretion). Appellants 
invoked footnote 10 in Kucana, which emphasized that, by definition, specified discretion requires 
explicit or detailed language and cannot be anticipated or implied discretion. See Kucana v. Holder, 
558 U.S. 233, 243 n.10 (2010) (differentiating specified discretion from implied or anticipated discre-
tion to limit the scope of jurisdictional bars to only statutes that specify discretion); Polfliet, F.3d at 
381 (rejecting appellant’s argument that the absence of the word discretion created ambiguity). 
 57 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 246–47 (analyzing the construction of 
the jurisdictional bar to conclude that it only applies to statutorily authorized discretionary decisions); 
Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (limiting Kucana to its holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar is 
not applicable to decisions that regulations, not statutes, made discretionary). 
 58 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (holding that “may” “at any time” and “for what 
he deems to be” clearly convey discretion). The court referenced the other circuit courts that found the 
plain language unambiguously discretionary as support for its holding. See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (cit-
ing El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2004) for the notion that the plain meaning of the 
statutory language conveys discretion and citing the circuit courts that previously reached similar conclu-
sions); see also Bernardo ex rel. M &K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 484 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the text of § 1155 clearly provided discretionary authority). 
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gal standard.59 Instead, it asserted that § 1155 grants discretionary authority to 
determine what constitutes “good and sufficient cause.”60 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.61 
II. DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 8 U.S.C. § 1155 
The unbalanced circuit split concerning the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1155 appears to grant significant weight to the holding of a majority of cir-
cuit courts, however, the merits of the minority approach warrant further dis-
cussion as well.62 Section A of this Part discusses how the dissent in the First 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s focus on “good and sufficient 
cause”); ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the legislative history 
of § 1155 to find that “good and sufficient cause” constitutes a legal standard that constrains the Sec-
retary’s discretion). 
 60 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 (asserting that the word “deems” conveys discretion to determine 
“good and sufficient cause”). Interestingly, the court disclosed that in a previous unpublished decision, 
the Fourth Circuit retained jurisdiction to review a visa petition revocation decision to determine if “good 
and sufficient cause” existed. See id. at 383 n.7 (acknowledging that the court previously exercised 
judicial review of a visa petition revocation (citing Oddo v. Reno, 175 F.3d 1015 (4th Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam)). Appellants argued that the Fourth Circuit’s 1999 case, Oddo v. Reno, demonstrated that the 
court previously treated the language of § 1155 as a reviewable legal standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (au-
thorizing the revocation of visa petitions “at any time” for “good and sufficient cause”); Polfliet, 955 
F.3d at 383 n.7 (addressing the appellants’ invocation of Oddo); Oddo, 175 F.3d 1015, at *3 (reviewing 
USCIS’s decision to revoke a visa petition pursuant to § 1155). The court dismissed this argument by 
asserting that Oddo was not precedential and did not discuss the jurisdictional bar. Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 
383; see Oddo, 175 F.3d 1015, at *3 (reviewing and affirming the administrative decision to revoke 
Oddo’s visa petition in an unpublished, per curiam opinion). 
 61 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the jurisdictional bar preclud-
ed review of petitioner’s constitutional claims. See id. (rejecting petitioner’s argument that their constitu-
tional claims were excluded from the jurisdictional bar). Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) carves out a 
limited exception to the jurisdictional bar for constitutional questions, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the 
exemption to apply only during a noncitizen’s removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
(providing that § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not preclude review of constitutional claims that are “filed with 
an appropriate court of appeals”); Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (citing Lee v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Serv., 592 F.3d 612, 620 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that Congress intended to preserve judicial review of 
constitutional issues under § 1252(a)(2)(D) only when brought during removal proceedings)). Therefore, 
because Kimiki was not actively in removal proceedings, the court did not have jurisdiction to review his 
constitutional claims. See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (dismissing the constitutional claims because Polfliet 
and Kimiki asserted them outside of the context of removal proceedings). 
 62 See Karakenyan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., 468 F. Supp. 3d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2020) 
(noting that the unbalanced nature of the circuit split could “almost tip over the scale”). Critics charac-
terized the breadth of support for the majority approach as a “precedential cascade,” because many cir-
cuits joined the majority without contributing significant independent analysis. See Bernardo ex rel. M 
& K Eng’g v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 508 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (finding the numerical 
imbalance in the circuit split unpersuasive because many of the decisions came in quick succession 
without additional analysis). The rapid succession of circuit courts joining the majority of the split 
with minimal analysis is indicative of a precedential cascade. See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: 
An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 89–92 (1999) (discussing the phenomena of cascading judicial 
decisions, including the efficiency benefits and opportunities for bias and undermining credibility of 
legal doctrines). Many of the circuit court decisions preceded the 2010 Supreme Court decision Kucana 
v. Holder and were not subject to Kucana’s analytical approach to jurisdictional bars. See 558 U.S. 233, 
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Circuit decision, in 2016, Bernardo ex rel. M & K Engineering v. Johnson, ap-
plied the Supreme Court’s analysis from the 2010 decision, Kucana v. Hold-
er.63 Section B discusses the Fourth Circuit’s contributions to the circuit split 
and its response to Kucana in its 2020 decision, Polfliet v. Cuccinelli.64 
A. The Impact of Kucana on the Analysis of Judicial Review of § 1155 
The First Circuit dissent in 2016, in Bernardo ex rel. M&K Engineering, 
used the interpretive guidance from Kucana to argue that the jurisdictional bar, 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(2), does not preclude review of visa petition revoca-
tions.65 Namely, the Bernardo dissent asserted that the strong presumption of 
jurisdiction over administrative decisions requires a narrow interpretation of 
the jurisdictional bar.66 The Bernardo dissent recognized that § 1155 contains 
discretionary language but argued that the phrase “good and sufficient cause” 
is an objective legal standard that constrains the discretion that the statute oth-
erwise grants.67 The dissent further argued that the presence of objective legal 
                                                                                                                           
243–52 (2010) (prescribing a narrow interpretation of jurisdictional bars based on statutory construc-
tion and legislative intent analysis); see, e.g., Abdelwahab v. Frazer, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the statute conveyed discretionary authority); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222, 223–
25 (5th Cir. 2007) (neglecting to apply a presumption of review); Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 
447 F.3d 196, 200–05 (3d Cir. 2006) (analyzing the jurisdictional bar’s application to § 1155 without 
discussion of the presumption of jurisdiction). Although the cases following Kucana continued to join 
the majority’s holding, the analysis differed from the pre-Kucana cases. See Kucana, 558 U.S. 243–52 
(asserting that courts should construe jurisdictional bars narrowly); see, e.g., Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 
485 (holding that § 1155’s specific language overcomes the presumption of jurisdiction articulated in 
Kucana); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding the language of § 1155 
is sufficiently specific, as defined in Kucana). 
 63 See infra notes 65–77 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
 65 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243–52 (analyzing the scope of the juris-
dictional bar by interpreting the statutory construction and legislative history and applying a presump-
tion of jurisdiction); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 495–508 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (arguing that the interpre-
tive principles from Kucana compel retention of jurisdiction to review visa petition revocations). The 
dissent applied Kucana to expand on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 2004, in ANA Int’l Inc. v. Way. 
See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243–52 (holding that the presumption of jurisdiction combined with statutory 
construction and legislative history analysis required a narrow interpretation of the catchall jurisdic-
tional bar); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 495–508 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (adopting the statutory construction 
analysis from Kucana and the analysis regarding the existence of a legal standard in 8 U.S.C. § 1155 
from ANA International); ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 891–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (splitting 
from the Seventh Circuit to retain jurisdiction to review visa revocation decisions by interpreting 8 
U.S.C. § 1155 to contain a legal standard). 
 66 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 495 (Lipez, J. dissenting); see Kucana, 558 
U.S. at 251–52 (asserting that the presumption of jurisdiction is a longstanding principle in immigra-
tion law); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (holding that the presumption of jurisdiction mandates a narrow 
construction of the jurisdictional bar, such that it only bars matters of pure discretion from judicial re-
view). 
 67 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 504 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s 
emphasis on the quantity of discretionary terms because “good and sufficient cause” constrains each); 
ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893 (holding that “good and sufficient cause” is a legal standard subject to judicial 
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criteria creates uncertainty surrounding whether § 1155 is a specific grant of 
discretionary authority.68 Therefore, it contended that the statute fails to meet 
the requirement of “specified” discretion, as articulated in Kucana.69 
Additionally, the Bernardo dissent examined § 1155’s legislative ratifica-
tion history.70 It argued that the statute’s reenactments in 1996 and 2004 indi-
cated congressional acceptance of the interpretation of “good and sufficient 
cause” as a legal standard.71 Further, the dissent asserted that Congress was 
aware of language that unambiguously conveys discretionary authority, but 
                                                                                                                           
review). The Bernardo dissent synthesized various BIA opinions and visa petition requirements to assert 
that “good and sufficient cause” exists when the evidentiary record would not support approval of such a 
petition. See 814 F.3d at 496–97 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (providing examples of objective documentation 
that would inform determinations of “good and sufficient cause”). The Bernardo dissent asserted that the 
BIA’s consistent treatment of “good and sufficient cause” as an objective standard indicates that the 
phrase has a specific, well known meaning in the immigration context. See id. at 496 (analyzing the 
BIA’s treatment of “good and sufficient cause” as an objective evidentiary standard); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d 
at 894 (adopting the BIA interpretation of § 1155 to retain jurisdiction to review the objective legal stand-
ard); Matter of R.I. Ortega, 28 I. & N. Dec. 9, 15 (B.I.A. 2020) (finding that “good and sufficient” cause 
existed where substantial evidence demonstrated that USCIS would deny the visa petition); Matter of 
Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 170 (B.I.A. 1990) (reversing revocation decision because the evidence 
did not arise to “good and sufficient cause” to revoke); Matter of Estime, 19 I. & N. Dec. 450, 450 
(B.I.A. 1987) (explaining that “good and sufficient cause” is met when the existing evidence would bar 
approval of a visa petition). 
 68 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 496 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the 
divergent interpretations of § 1155 demonstrate that Congress did not specify discretion); Kucana, 
558 U.S. at 243 n.10 (explaining that the jurisdictional bar applies to statutes that explicitly detail 
discretionary authority). 
 69 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243 n.10 (defining “specify” as provid-
ing explicit detail); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 496 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting the definition of “speci-
fy” the Court provided in Kucana). The Bernardo majority refuted the dissent’s reliance on Kucana by 
citing another footnote where the Court referred to the word “may” as an indication of discretionary 
authority. See Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 486–87 (opinion of Lynch, J.) (explaining that Kucana did not 
change the analysis of § 1155 because the Supreme Court offered a statute containing the same condi-
tional phrase as § 1155 as an example of discretionary language (citing Kucana, 558 U.S. at 247 n.13)). 
 70 See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 249 (analyzing legislative history to infer congressional intent from the 
historic treatment of motions to reopen); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 499–500 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that § 1155’s ratification history informs the analysis of congressional intent). Compare 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1155 (1996) (authorizing the revocation of visa petitions so long as the petitioner received notice 
prior to entering the United States), with id. § 1155 (2004) (granting authority to revoke visa petitions 
without a statutory notice requirement). 
 71 See Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 499–500 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (asserting that Congress was aware 
of the consistent BIA interpretation of “good and sufficient cause”). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1996) 
(authorizing the revocation of visa petitions when petitioners were given notice before their arrival), 
with id. § 1155 (2004) (removing the notice requirement with no change to the rest of the statute). In 
1996, Congress reenacted § 1155 as part of IIRIRA, without alteration. See id. § 1155 (1996) (including 
visa petition revocation under the umbrella immigration bill, IIRIRA). In 2004, Congress amended 
§ 1155 to remove two sentences but left the rest of the statute unchanged. See id. § 1155 (2004) (remov-
ing an ambiguous notice requirement). Conversely, some courts found that the 2004 amendment to 
§ 1155 reflected congressional intent to further restrict judicial review of immigration decisions. Id.  
§ 1155; see, e.g., Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that 
§ 1155’s amendment suggested an intent to clearly convey discretionary authority). 
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declined to use it in § 1155.72 For these reasons, the dissent argued that Con-
gress intended to preserve the objective legal criteria in § 1155 and to constrain 
the Secretary’s discretionary authority.73 
Moreover, the Bernardo dissent applied Kucana to examine the structure 
of the jurisdictional bar.74 The dissent argued that the nature of visa petition 
revocations significantly differs from the discretionary relief decisions that 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) enumerates.75 Unlike the decisions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), 
revocation of a visa petition does not automatically result in removal from the 
United States.76 Therefore, the dissent asserted that the jurisdictional bar 
should not preclude review of visa petition revocation decisions.77 
                                                                                                                           
 72 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 501 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress 
unequivocally conveyed discretion in other statutes of the INA); see also ANA Int’l., 393 F.3d at 893–
94 (arguing that Congress could have chosen different language, so retention of “good and sufficient 
cause” signaled recognition of the agency meaning). The dissent noted that the phrase “good and suffi-
cient cause” does not appear in any other INA provision. Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 499 (Lipez, J., dissent-
ing). 
 73 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2020); see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 499–501 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the consistent reenactment of § 1155 is a sufficient indication of congressional approval of the BIA’s 
interpretation). Conversely, the Bernardo majority asserted that inconsistent judicial interpretation and 
lack of affirmative recognition by Congress undermine the legislative ratification argument. 814 F.3d 
at 489–90 (opinion of Lynch, J.). The dissent argued that it does not. See id. at 502 n.31 (Lipez, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the legislative ratification canon does not require Congress’s affirmative 
recognition). 
 74 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 245–48 (analyzing the statutory con-
struction to deduce the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 505–07 (Lipez, J., dis-
senting) (using Kucana’s approach to differentiate visa petition revocations from the decisions subject 
to the jurisdictional bar). 
 75 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 506 (Lipez, J., dissenting) 
(comparing § 1155 to the enumerated decisions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). The Bernardo majority de-
clined to decide this point because appellants waived it. 814 F.3d at 492 n.17 (opinion of Lynch, J.). 
Nonetheless, the court ruminated that the emphasis on decision type in Kucana served to contrast 
procedural devices from discretionary decisions. Id. at 493. 
 76 See Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 506–07 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (distinguishing potential eligibility for 
a visa from substantive forms of relief such as cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure). 
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (barring judicial review of decisions relating to the ability to 
remain in the country including, eligibility for admission and cancellation of removal), with id. § 1155 
(authorizing the revocation of visa petitions). Although the revocation of the visa petition renders the 
beneficiary ineligible for a visa, actually instigating removal proceedings requires additional action. 
See id. § 1202 (listing the requirements to apply for an immigrant visa); id. § 1229(a) (describing the 
process to initiate removal proceedings). 
 77 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 1155; see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 248 (asserting that the juris-
dictional bar applies to substantive decisions similar to the enumerated actions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)); 
Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 506 (Lipez J., dissenting) (arguing that visa petition revocation is not categori-
cally substantive but, rather, is an adjunct decision). 
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B. The Contributions of Polfliet v. Cuccinelli: Rejecting Kucana 
The Fourth Circuit in Polfliet echoed the majority of circuit courts and 
rested its analysis of § 1155 on the plain meaning of the statute.78 The court 
emphasized the quantity of discretionary terms in the statute and found that the 
consecutive application of discretionary language specified discretion.79 The 
Fourth Circuit narrowly construed the precedential value of Kucana.80 Unlike 
other post-Kucana decisions, the Fourth Circuit did not acknowledge the pre-
sumption of judicial review for administrative decisions.81 Instead, the court 
dismissed the appellants’ argument that the presumption should apply to the 
analysis.82 The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that Kucana required the 
inclusion of “discretion” to clearly specify discretionary authority.83 The court 
asserted that even absent the exact word, the statute unambiguously specified 
discretion.84 
                                                                                                                           
 78 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377, 381–82 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that 
the majority of circuit courts support the court’s conclusion); see, e.g., Mehanna v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigr. Serv., 677 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the text of the statute specified discre-
tion); Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (examining the discretion-
ary terms in § 1155); El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the lan-
guage of the statute conveys discretionary authority). 
 79 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (finding the successive use of “may,” “at any 
time,” and “for what he deems to be” unambiguously conveys discretion). But see ANA Int’l, Inc. v. 
Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (arguing that a holistic reading reveals that “good and 
sufficient cause” constrains the discretion). The Fourth Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis 
on “good and sufficient cause” for failing to acknowledge the role of “deems” as a modifier on the 
phrase. See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 (classifying the Ninth Circuit approach as operating in a vacuum); 
ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893 (finding that legislative history demonstrated that “good and sufficient 
cause” was a legal standard). 
 80 Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382; see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243–52 (prescribing an analytical approach 
to construing § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit asserted that Kucana did not change its 
interpretation of § 1155. See Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
applying the analysis from Kucana reached the same result). 
 81 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d 380–84 (declining to discuss the presumption of jurisdiction). Other 
circuit courts recognized the presumption of review governing the application of jurisdictional bars, and 
continued to hold that § 1155 overcomes it. 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see, e.g., Mehanna, 677 F.3d at 317 (not-
ing that Kucana instructs a narrow interpretation of jurisdictional bars but still finding that the lan-
guage overcomes the presumption of jurisdiction); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 485 (finding that the lan-
guage of § 1155 overcomes the presumption of jurisdiction). 
 82 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 1155; see Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381 (finding that the presump-
tion of jurisdiction did not apply because § 1155 was unambiguous). This contradicts the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s use of the presumption of jurisdiction as a core interpretive principle. See ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 
891 (analyzing the jurisdictional bar with a presumption of jurisdiction). 
 83 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381 (finding that Kucana primarily compared statutes and regulations 
and did not mandate that the only means of unambiguously conveying discretion was reciting the 
exact word); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243 n.10 (defining specify as to convey explicitly). 
 84 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 382 (holding that § 1155’s consecutive discretionary 
terms clearly indicated discretion). Section 1155 consecutively includes the words “may,” which is 
permissive rather than mandatory, “at any time,” which provides temporal flexibility, and “for what he 
deems to be,” which places the decision in the purview of the authorized decisionmaker. 8 U.S.C. 
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The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that despite the loss of Kimiki’s visa eli-
gibility, the government had not pursued his removal from the United States.85 
Although the court recognized that the revocation decision did not directly result 
in Kimiki’s removal, the court did not discuss Kucana’s distinction between cat-
egorically substantive decisions, to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, and ad-
junct decisions, which avoid the jurisdictional bar.86 Instead, the court found that 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precluded review of the visa petition revocation decision.87 
III. KUCANA ENDORSES RESISTING THE “PRECEDENTIAL CASCADE” 
In 2020, the Fourth Circuit, in Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, erred by joining the 
“precedential cascade” of circuit courts in narrowly interpreting the INA’s juris-
dictional bar without considering the Supreme Court’s direction in the 2010 de-
cision, Kucana v. Holder.88 The Fourth Circuit failed to consider the presump-
tion of jurisdiction to review administrative decisions.89 Instead, the Fourth Cir-
cuit required a less stringent showing of discretion to apply the jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                           
§ 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 485–86 (discussing how the language in § 1155 conveys discretion 
and holding that the language signals that Congress intended to preclude judicial review). 
 85 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384 (noting that Kimiki had not faced removal proceedings despite the 
revocation of his visa petition years earlier). 
 86 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 248 (distinguishing unreviewable sub-
stantive decisions, which determine the ability to remain in the United States, from procedural deci-
sions); Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 377 (discussing the procedural posture in reference to preclusion of the 
petitioners’ constitutional claims only). But see Mehanna, 677 F.3d at 317 (classifying visa petition 
revocation decisions as substantive). 
 87 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 1155; see Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384 (dismissing appellants’ 
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 88 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (acting as a catchall provision barring discretionary decisions 
from judicial review); see Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251–52 (2010) (applying a strong pre-
sumption of judicial review to narrowly construe the jurisdictional bar); Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 
F.3d 377, 382 (4th Cir. 2020) (dismissing Kucana as irrelevant to the analysis of 8 U.S.C. § 1155); 
Bernardo ex rel. M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 508 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lipez, J., dissent-
ing) (characterizing the circuit split as a “precedential cascade” and critiquing the holdings of the 
circuit split majority). The precedential cascade demonstrates the expediency of the majority’s posi-
tion more than it does the merits. See, e.g., Sands v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 308 F. App’x 418 
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (dismissing review of § 1155 decision for lack of jurisdiction without 
substantial analysis); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting the weight of 
authority supporting the application of the jurisdictional bar); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222, 
223–24 (5th Cir. 2007) (adopting the reasoning of previous circuit court decisions to find that the 
jurisdictional bar precluded review of the visa petition). Although courts do not often admit it, pre-
cluding review of visa petition revocation decisions effectively serves judicial efficiency goals. See ANA 
Int’l Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 895 (9th Cir. 2004) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (expressing frustration 
that the court retained jurisdiction to review visa decisions because of the foreseeable burden on the 
court). 
 89 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 380–81 (resting its analysis on the statute’s plain language). But see 
Kucana, 558 U.S. at 252 (asserting that the presumption of jurisdiction to review immigration deci-
sions is a longstanding interpretive principle); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (noting that the presumption 
of jurisdiction governed the interpretation of jurisdictional bars). 
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bar.90 In Kucana, the Court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies 
only to statutes that “specify” discretionary authority.91 The Court provided 
that implied or anticipated discretion is distinct from specified discretion.92 
Although the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1155 contains terms that signal discretion, 
circuit courts disagree on whether “good and sufficient cause” constrains that 
discretion.93 The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize that the existence of a cir-
cuit split indicates that § 1155 is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpreta-
tions.94 
The Fourth Circuit erred by failing to look beyond the statutory language 
to examine the legislative history of § 1155 and the statutory construction of 
the jurisdictional bar.95 During the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, Congress 
reenacted § 1155 without alteration, despite explicitly granting discretionary 
                                                                                                                           
 90 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Compare Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 379 (asserting that the statute is 
subject to the jurisdictional bar because it is sufficiently discretionary), with ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 
891 (limiting the scope of the jurisdictional bar to purely discretionary matters). This difference is 
indicative of a larger challenge: determining the meaning of discretion in the immigration context. See 
Kanstroom, supra note 12, at 163 (discussing the ambiguity of distinguishing law from discretion in 
immigration statutes). 
 91 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243 n.10 (describing the requirements for 
a statute to be subject to the jurisdictional bar). 
 92 See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 243 n.10 (articulating that “specified” means stated explicitly, which 
contrasts with the ambiguity inherent in implied or anticipated discretion). 
 93 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 496 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the BIA 
consistently treats “good and sufficient cause” as a legal standard, suggesting that the statute does not 
clearly specify discretion); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893 (conceding that the statute conveys some level 
of discretion but holding that a legal standard constrains the discretion); see also, e.g., Matter of Taw-
fik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 170 (B.I.A. 1990) (reversing a revocation decision for failure to satisfy the 
“good and sufficient cause” standard). The Fourth Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit for concentrating 
on the phrase “good and sufficient cause” without considering the meaning within the context of the 
sentence. See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 383 (finding that the word “deems” makes “good and sufficient 
cause” discretionary). Still, the Fourth Circuit committed a similar error by limiting its analysis to the 
words “may,” “at any time,” and “deem.” See id. at 382–83 (discussing the meaning of each discretionary 
term); ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 893 (insisting that statutory interpretation required examination of the 
entire statute, including the meaning of “good and sufficient cause”). 
 94 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see Josh Adams, Federal Court Jurisdiction Over Visa Revocations, 32 VT. 
L. REV. 291, 306 (2007) (noting that § 1155 was marginally ambiguous if it could result in divergent 
interpretations). Compare Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381 (asserting that the statutory language was clear), 
and El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that discerning “good and suffi-
cient cause” is a highly subjective endeavor), with ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 894 (holding that “good and 
sufficient cause” presents an objective standard that curbs discretion). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit’s 
previous review of visa petition revocations demonstrates that the same court can construe § 1155 differ-
ently. Compare Oddo v. Reno, 175 F.3d 1015, at *3 (4th Cir. 1999) (reviewing a visa revocation deci-
sion for legal error), with Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 377 (dismissing review of a visa petition revocation for 
lack of jurisdiction). 
 95 8 U.S.C. § 1155; id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381–83 (finding that the text 
of the statute sufficiently conveyed discretionary authority). But see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 245–48 
(analyzing the construction of the jurisdictional bar to determine whether motions to reopen were 
comparable to the expressly barred substantive decisions); Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 498 (Lipez, J., dis-
senting) (analyzing § 1155’s legislative ratification history to determine congressional intent). 
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authority in other parts of the Act.96 In 2004, Congress amended § 1155 to re-
move an ambiguous notice requirement but left the rest of the statute un-
changed.97 Congress’ continued omission of explicit language and retention of 
the phrase “good and sufficient cause” through two re-enactments suggests that 
Congress anticipated that § 1155 was a discretionary grant of authority but ne-
glected to specify it.98 
The guidance for statutory construction that Kucana provided instructs 
courts to compare the nature of the particular statute and the discretionary re-
lief decisions subject to the jurisdictional bar.99 Visa petition revocation deci-
sions are not substantially similar to the enumerated decisions that 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars because retracting eligibility for an immigrant visa is 
procedurally distinct from denying someone relief from deportation.100 Revo-
cation does not automatically trigger removal proceedings, as the continual 
                                                                                                                           
 96 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1996); see, e.g., id. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii) (specifying that the Secretary alone 
has discretion to waive the AWA bar for petitioners with a conviction of an offense against a minor). 
 97 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2004). The 2004 amendments removed a notice requirement that created 
uncertainty regarding the permissibility of revocations of visa petitions for people already in the Unit-
ed States. See Firstland Int’l Inc. v. I.N.S., 377 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1155’s 
notice requirement was not unambiguously discretionary, therefore reserving jurisdiction to review 
whether USCIS satisfied the procedural requirements despite noting that the rest of § 1155 would not 
be subject to judicial review). 
 98 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2020); see Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 243 n.10 (2010) (noting that 
Congress must specify discretion for the jurisdictional bar to apply and the definition of “specify” is 
distinct from anticipate or imply). The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that a statute must include 
the word discretion to specify discretionary authority. Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381–82. Still, Congress’s 
frequent use of more explicit language to convey discretion is notable. See Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 499 
(Lipez, J. dissenting) (noting that “good and sufficient cause” exclusively appears in § 1155). The 
Bernardo dissent used § 1155’s legislative ratification history to argue that Congress intended to re-
tain the agency interpretation of § 1155. 8 U.S.C. § 1155; Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 499 (Lipez, J. dis-
senting). The longstanding, consistent BIA interpretation of “good and sufficient cause” implies congres-
sional awareness of the phrase’s meaning as a term of art. See Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 498 (Lipez, J. dis-
senting) (citing BIA decisions that apply a legal standard to review § 1155 decisions); see, e.g., Matter of 
R.I. Ortega, 28 I. & N. Dec. 9, 15 (B.I.A. 2020) (treating “good and sufficient cause” as an objective 
standard). 
 99 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 247–49 (analyzing the character of the deci-
sions that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) barred to assess the applicability of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). 
 100 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); id. § 1155; see Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 247–48 (asserting that the 
jurisdictional bar applies to similar discretionary relief decisions). Approved visa petitions do not 
convey the same right to remain in the United States as actual visas. See Matter of Ho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
582, 589 (B.I.A. 1988) (explaining that visa petition approval is merely a step in the visa process); 
Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 506 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that visa issuance is a discretionary decision 
in which USCIS considers factors beyond visa petition approval). In 2012, the Sixth Circuit, in Me-
hanna v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Service, found that § 1155 decisions were substantive. See 677 
F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2012) (characterizing the visa petition revocation as a substantive decision that 
governs a petitioner’s ability to remain in the United States). Approved visa petitions are only one 
factor in determining eligibility for visas, and they do not alone grant any right to legal status. See 
Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 508 n.40 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (identifying this mistake in Mehanna and noting 
that visa petition approval alone does not determine whether someone can remain in the United 
States). 
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presence of the petitioner, Kimiki, in Polfliet v. Cuccinelli demonstrated.101 
Therefore, revocation of an approved visa petition is not categorically similar 
to the substantive decisions under § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i), and should not be subject 
to the catchall provision of the jurisdictional bar, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).102 After 
Kucana provided these analytical principles and reasserted the presumption of 
judicial review, the Fourth Circuit should have narrowly construed the jurisdic-
tional bar, resisted the precedential cascade, and joined the Ninth Circuit.103 
CONCLUSION 
In 2020, the Fourth Circuit in Polfliet v. Cuccinelli held that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of visa petition revocation decisions by 
interpreting the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1155 as an unambiguous grant of 
discretionary authority. The language of § 1155 is subject to different interpre-
tations, and where such ambiguity exists, courts should construe statutes in 
favor of the retention of judicial review. Retaining the phrase “good and suffi-
cient cause” through two amendments to § 1155 implies that Congress was 
aware of the established agency interpretation as a legal standard. Visa petition 
revocation decisions also notably differ from the substantive decisions that 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) expressly bars. Therefore, § 1155 does not overcome the 
strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction to review administrative decisions. 
For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit should have adopted the principles that 
the Supreme Court employed in 2010, in Kucana v. Holder, to retain jurisdic-




Preferred citation: Nicole Arata, Comment, Judicial Review of Visa Petition Revocations: A “Prece-
dential Cascade,” 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II.-366 (2021), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol62/iss9/21/. 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 384 (recognizing that the government had not initiated removal pro-
ceedings against Kimiki following the revocation of his visa petition). 
 102 8 U.S.C. § 1155; see id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (precluding judicial review of specific immigration 
decisions that directly impact the noncitizen’s ability to remain in the country, such as cancellation of 
removal); id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (prohibiting judicial review of a broad category of discretionary 
decisions); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 248 (distinguishing substantive decisions from adjunct procedures); 
Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 506 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (differentiating the authority under § 1155 from the 
substantive decisions § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars). 
 103 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Kucana, 558 U.S. at 252 (specifying that surmounting the 
presumption of jurisdiction requires clear and convincing evidence); ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 
886, 891–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (retaining jurisdiction to review § 1155 decisions by applying the pre-
sumption of jurisdiction and finding that the statute contained a legal standard). 
